TY - CHAP
T1 - Vagueness, supertranslatability, and conceptual schemes
AU - Blinov, Arcady Leonidovich
PY - 2007
Y1 - 2007
N2 - A case is developed against Donald Davidson's thesis that any attempt to give meaning to the idea of conceptual relativism is doomed. Even under Davidson's assumption that untranslatability is a necessary condition of a difference between two schemes, it appears to be possible to conceive a situation in which one language is untranslatable for another, but still accessible for truth testing, which undermines Davidson's main argument. One further argument of Davidson's is countered by the observation that even if we play the game of radical interpretation strictly on Davidson's terms, we may well encounter a situation in which the only rational choice is to allow for partial failures of translation, and thus for a difference between the two conceptual schemes.
AB - A case is developed against Donald Davidson's thesis that any attempt to give meaning to the idea of conceptual relativism is doomed. Even under Davidson's assumption that untranslatability is a necessary condition of a difference between two schemes, it appears to be possible to conceive a situation in which one language is untranslatable for another, but still accessible for truth testing, which undermines Davidson's main argument. One further argument of Davidson's is countered by the observation that even if we play the game of radical interpretation strictly on Davidson's terms, we may well encounter a situation in which the only rational choice is to allow for partial failures of translation, and thus for a difference between the two conceptual schemes.
KW - Philosophy of Language
UR - http://nla.gov.au/anbd.bib-an42712161
M3 - Chapter
SN - 9789027231024
VL - 1
T3 - Studies in language companion series
SP - 233
EP - 246
BT - Mental States: Volume 1: Evolution, function, nature
A2 - C. Schalley, Andrea
A2 - Khlentzos, Drew
PB - John Benjamins Publishing Company
CY - Amsterdam, Netherlands
ER -