La Theorie de la Negligence dans le Statut de la Cour Penale Internationale

Le Statut de la C.P.I., malgre son efficacite relative, tend a resumer l 'evolution du droit international penal 1. Au dela de quelques problemes de coherence, dus surtout aux procedures d'elaboration, sa partie generale constitue un effort remarquable de definition d'une theorie du crime a l'echelle universelle. Dans ce cadre un role important est joue par !'element subjectif, dont le potentiel d'harmonisation et d'unification est considerable.

The Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) outlines a theory of mens rea for international crimes, which is consistent with customary law only to a limited extent. The standard principle of imputation is intent, whereas negligence applies exceptionally. However, negligence is a general principle of imputation when a subordinate commits a war crime pursuant to the order of a superior or if a superior fails to exercise adequate control over an offence committed by a subordinate. Such a ‘dualistic’ approach raises problems of consistency and completeness, notably: (1) negligence may be overlooked as a principle of imputation; (2) the systematic nature of international crimes cannot be ordinarily imputed based on recklessness and advertent negligence; (3) inadequate consideration of evitable mistakes entails strict liability; (4) when negligence does not apply, an evitable mistake on defences other than superior orders excludes responsibility; (5) when a superior fails to exercise adequate control over crimes committed by subordinates, there is no adequate rationale for applying a different criterion of imputation to military superiors (negligence) and non-military superiors (intent). By virtue of Article 21 of its Statute, the ICC can apply customary law to fill such normative loopholes; however, this approach is not fully consistent with a strict interpretation of the principle of legality.