Abstract
Earnings management is found to be driven by different managerial incentives. Previous studies have identified that executive compensation contracts create incentives for earnings management. The agency theory and the positive accounting theory provide explanations for contract-driven earnings management. This study links the agency theory and the positive accounting theory and reviews the early executive compensation studies, bonus plan maximization hypothesis and equity-based compensation. The aim of this study is to shed light in explaining contractual incentives and provide useful information in understanding the executive compensation contract-driven earnings management behaviour.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages | 111-127 |
| Publication status | Published - 31 Dec 2012 |
| Event | MFA 2012: 14th Malaysian Finance Association Annual Conference - Emerging Markets and Financial Resilience: Decoupling Growth from Turbulence - Penang, Malaysia Duration: 1 Jun 2012 → 3 Jun 2012 |
Other
| Other | MFA 2012: 14th Malaysian Finance Association Annual Conference - Emerging Markets and Financial Resilience: Decoupling Growth from Turbulence |
|---|---|
| City | Penang, Malaysia |
| Period | 1/06/12 → 3/06/12 |
Keywords
- Corporate Governance and Stakeholder Engagement
- Finance
- Financial Econometrics
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