TY - CHAP
T1 - Anti-realist assumptions and challenges in philosophy of mind
AU - Khlentzos, Drew Michael
PY - 2007
Y1 - 2007
N2 - The plausibility of Naturalism - the view that the mind is a purely natural phenomenon that can be explained scientifically (if explained at all) - is a hotly contested topic in cognitive science, as every philosopher and cognitive scientist knows. It is not widely recognised, however that some of the more popular arguments against naturalism rest upon anti-realist metaphysical assumptions. This is a problem since the most plausible defences of naturalism presuppose a realist metaphysics. In this chapter, I shall chart one of these anti-realist assumptions and show how it features as a crucial premise in a leading anti-naturalist argument, the Knowledge Argument.
AB - The plausibility of Naturalism - the view that the mind is a purely natural phenomenon that can be explained scientifically (if explained at all) - is a hotly contested topic in cognitive science, as every philosopher and cognitive scientist knows. It is not widely recognised, however that some of the more popular arguments against naturalism rest upon anti-realist metaphysical assumptions. This is a problem since the most plausible defences of naturalism presuppose a realist metaphysics. In this chapter, I shall chart one of these anti-realist assumptions and show how it features as a crucial premise in a leading anti-naturalist argument, the Knowledge Argument.
KW - Philosophy of Cognition
UR - http://books.google.com.au/books?id=YUMrT_Fnoo8C&lpg=PP1&pg=PA213
UR - http://www.benjamins.com/cgi-bin/t_bookview.cgi?bookid=SLCS%2092
UR - http://nla.gov.au/anbd.bib-an42712161
M3 - Chapter
SN - 9789027231024
VL - 1: Evolution, function, nature
T3 - Studies in Language Companion Series (SLCS)
SP - 213
EP - 232
BT - Mental States
A2 - C. Schalley, Andrea
A2 - Khlentzos, Drew
PB - John Benjamins Publishing Company
CY - Amsterdam, Netherlands
ER -