An Examination of John Schellenberg's Austere Ultimism

John Schellenberg's trilogy is an original and thorough contribution to the philosophy of religion, focusing on ultimism, his term for the thesis that 'there is an ultimate reality in relation to which an ultimate good can be attained' (2005: 37). Ultimism is more generic than theism, namely belief in a personal God, but it may also be contrasted with strong atheism (the rejection of any sort of divine being at all) and naturalism, which is taken to imply strong atheism. Schellenberg's conclusions are that: (1) neither belief in theism nor belief in naturalism is justified, (2) nor is belief in ultimism justified; (3) faith in ultimism is justified, although (4) faith in a personal God is not. Schellenberg distinguishes a religion or a religious way of life from the conjunction of the propositions that supports it. Let us call the latter a religious skeleton. Ultimism is designed to be a minimal religious skeleton. Such religious minimalism is often the result of post-modern intellectual diffidence, but it should be emphasized right at the outset that Schellenberg's position is not diffident. For a start, contrary to the Wittgensteinians, he argues that, for the purposes of philosophy of religion, religion may be taken to have an essence, namely ultimism. More precisely, his definition is that 'S is religious' ... if and only if: S both 'takes there to be a reality that is metaphysically and axiologically ultimate in relation to which an ultimate good ultimate' and S's 'ultimate commitment is to the cultivation of dispositions appropriate to this state of affairs' (2005: 23). Here the word 'takes' covers both belief and faith. Even less diffidently, he argues that his preferred position, faith-without-belief in ultimism but not theism, is not merely justified but the only justified position. That quick summary leaves a lot out, of course, and in this review I shall first provide a more detailed account of the three volumes. Then I locate Schellenberg's positions along various 'dimensions' of the debate. After that I present some criticisms, of which the most serious are his avoidance of more general questions of both epistemology and metaphysics. I conclude with an appraisal of the importance of his position in the light of these criticisms.